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 ABSTRACT  
 
 Network and information security is very crucial in keeping large information 
infrastructures safe and secure. Many researchers have been working on different issues 
to strengthen and measure security of a network. An important problem is to model 
security in order to apply analysis schemes efficiently to that model. An attack graph is a 
tool to model security of a network which considers individual vulnerabilities in a global 
view where individual hosts are interconnected. The analysis of intrusion alert 
information is very important for security evaluation of the system. Because of the huge 
number of alerts raised by intrusion detection systems, it becomes difficult for security 
experts to analyze individual alerts. Researchers have worked to address this problem by 
clustering individual alerts based on similarity in their features such as source IP address, 
destination IP address, port numbers and others. In this paper, a different method for 
clustering intrusion alerts is proposed. Sequences of intrusion alerts are prepared by 
dividing all alerts according to specified time interval. The alert sequences are considered 
as temporal attack graphs. The sequences are clustered using graph clustering technique, 
which considers similarity in sequences as a factor to determine closeness of sequences. 
The suggested approach combines the concept of attack graphs and clustering on 
sequences of alerts using graph clustering technique. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 Today, computers are widely used by most corporations, organizations and 
government agencies almost everywhere in the world. The tremendous growth in 
electronic infrastructure has increasingly attracted cyber criminals. The extremely 
important information which includes but is not limited to military secrets, corporate 
documents and sensitive personal information such as identification documents, bank 
accounts is stored on computers and servers. Sometimes in addition to stealing the 
information, the motive of the attacker is to disrupt the services which are backed by 
electronic infrastructure. Therefore, the task of keeping sensitive information safe and 
computing resources secure is of utmost importance for security experts and engineers. 
The security measures for network and independent computers are vital, but not 
ultimately sufficient, to protect the information and infrastructure from being attacked by 
hackers and compromised. The vulnerabilities present in application software and 
operating systems tend to assist attackers and malicious users. 
 
1.1 Software Vulnerabilities 
According to [10], “information security vulnerability is a mistake in software 
that can be directly used by a hacker to gain access to a system or network”. One very 
common class of vulnerabilities is exposed because of buffer overflow. Buffer overflow 
occurs when memory write operation in a computer program exceeds the allocated range 
of the memory. A buffer overflow can be used to execute malicious programs by altering 
the flow of execution of the original program. Additionally, some programming language 
constructs are prone to errors and leaks, and using such constructs carelessly opens up 
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opportunities to attackers. According to [10], each year thousands of vulnerabilities are 
discovered, and keeping all systems up-to-date with patches remains a challenging task. 
Though security patches may be published shortly after vulnerability is reported, the 
patches are not immediately applied to the systems for various reasons. Sometimes, the 
patches which are written in response to emergency may contain other bugs. The patches 
released for an operating system may require restarting the system. Administrators may 
not restart the systems where the availability and continuity of business is critical.  
A computer system consists of hardware and software, which are built on 
different architectures and packages and provide various ways of interaction. It is 
impossible to eliminate all security vulnerabilities of a system considering complexity in 
building those systems and the interactivity between its components. Therefore, 
analyzing system globally is important to find possibility and severity of attacks on the 
system [2]. To determine the security of a system, a security analyst needs to 
appropriately model the system that takes into account local vulnerabilities and their 
global effects caused due to interaction [2].  
 
Figure 1. Vulnerability Analysis of a Network 
Source: [1] 
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Figure 1 shows classical process of vulnerability analysis in a network. First, 
scanning tools are run against different hosts and determine individual vulnerabilities of 
hosts. Then, local vulnerability information combined with information about 
connections in a network can be used by a security analyst to prepare an attack graph. 
 
1.2 Attack Graphs 
First, let us consider an example. An attacker tries to exploit vulnerability in 
particular version of ftp and succeeds in overwriting .rhosts file on a victim machine. The 
attacker can remotely login to the victim machine in the subsequent action. The 
compromised victim machine can be used by the attacker to maliciously capture another 
system in the network. Researchers and analysts have given different approaches to 
model such chain of actions in graphs or trees [3].  
According to Sheyner et al. [4], a network attack graph is a state transition 
diagram in which each state represents a state of the attacker, the defender and the 
system. Transitions in an attack graph represent actions taken by an attacker which results 
in a change in the state of the entire system [5]. An action from the attacker may lead to 
the state which is the attacker’s goal. If the system is in a final state, it means that the 
attacker has succeeded in exploiting the system. An action from a defender or a red team 
can void the actions of the attacker and can lead to previous safer states. Sheyner et al. [4] 
formally define an attack graphs as:  
“An attack graphs or AG is a tuple G = (S, T, S0, Ss), where S is a set of states, T 
⊆ S × S is  a transition relation, S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states, and Ss ⊆ S is a set of 
success states.” Ss denotes states which mean that an intruder has successfully achieved 
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his goal. Attack graphs serve as an important technique for understanding and analyzing 
vulnerabilities in networks.  
Attack graph is a tool that facilitates analysis of system security in a global 
perspective. A node in an attack graph represents state of the system and an edge 
represents an action taken by an attacker. Traditionally, attack graphs are prepared by red 
teams manually and it is a tedious task. Researchers have suggested different approaches 
to generate attack graphs automatically. Section 2.0 contains more information about 
different techniques for automated generation of attack graphs. Data mining is one of the 
techniques to generate attack graphs from intrusion alerts. 
 
1.3 Intrusion Alerts Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, attackers attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in operating 
systems and applications to gain unauthorized access to the system and/or perform denial 
of service (DOS) attack on the system. As it is unrealistic to build a perfectly secure 
system, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has an important role to play in identifying 
threats and malicious attempts. IDS can be deployed as a network based or a host based 
system. IDS recognizes intrusion attempts and raises alerts containing information such 
as source IP, destination IP, port numbers and the service being attacked. Though it is 
possible and practical to prevent the attacks when they are detected, the analysis of 
intrusion alerts is equally important to determine the level of damage done to the system 
for recovery operation.  The analysis of intrusion alerts done afterwards is known as post-
analysis or post-mortem of intrusion alerts. 
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1.4 Problem Addressed 
Intrusion alert analysis is performed to investigate security incidents and estimate 
the damage due to intrusion. An IDS may raise thousands of alerts even in a day, which 
makes manually analyzing those alerts “tedious, time-consuming and error-prone” [14]. 
One of the useful techniques for alerts analysis is alert correlation. Alert Correlation 
System (ACS) performs post-analysis on intrusion alerts, presents high-level 
understanding of the security state of the system and also filters false positives and 
redundant alerts. Alert clustering method for correlation is helpful to identify the groups 
of alerts and reduce the number of alerts. 
The ordinary alert clustering technique only tries to group the alerts with similar 
attribute values. For example, the alerts with same source IP address, destination IP 
address, source port and destination port are likely to be assigned to a single cluster. In 
addition to such clustering, it is necessary to analyze an intrusion alert in context of other 
alerts occurring before and after it. In this research, a graph-based clustering technique is 
suggested for alert correlation. First, the intrusion alerts are pre-processed to form alert 
sequences and temporal attack graphs. Then, the temporal attack graphs are clustered by 
graph clustering technique discussed later in this paper. The suggested approach gives a 
security expert an opportunity to analyze alert sequences instead of individual alerts, 
hence, alert patterns instead of individual alerts. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate a 
graph-based clustering technique for clustering intrusion alert sequences. 
In the following sections of this paper, the graph-based clustering approach is 
discussed in detail. 
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2.0 RELATED WORK 
 This section briefly describes work done by researchers in the field of network 
security, attack graphs and analysis of intrusion alerts through correlation. 
 
2.1 Attack Graphs Generation by Model Checking 
Sheyner et al. [4] have done pioneer work of modeling global view of network 
security by constructing attack graphs. Traditionally, attack graphs are prepared manually 
by red teams. But, this process is highly error-prone, time-consuming and impractical 
when the network is larger than hundred nodes [4]. Sheyner et al. constructed attack 
graphs automatically using symbolic model checking algorithms. The steps they followed 
to construct an attack graph are: 
1. Model the network – Sheyner et al. model the network as a finite state 
machine and state transitions denote atomic actions performed by attackers. 
Also, desired security property is specified, for example, an intruder must 
not be able to FTP to machine A.  
2. Produce an attack graph – The model from step 1 is used by modified 
NuSMV [8], a model checker, to automatically generate attack graphs. 
GraphViz visualization package is used to render the graphs [9]. 
Figure 2 shows architecture of tool suite used in [4]. A user may specify network 
model and security properties in XML. A special purpose compiler built by Sheyner et al. 
converts XML specifications into the input language of NuSMV. They provide an 
algorithm for attack graph generation. The techniques are highly dependent on underlying 
data structures and algorithms of model checking in NuSMV. 
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Figure 2. Tool Suite Architecture 
Source: [4] 
In this approach, the nodes represent the security state of the system as a set of 
properties, and edges represent actions of an attacker which change the state of the 
system. This approach is not scalable because the number of states can grow out of 
control with increase in set of properties. 
 
2.2 Logical Attack Graphs 
 The concept of logical attack graphs has been proposed by Ou et al. [6]. The 
model checking system discussed has scalability issues and does not perform efficiently 
when the size of network is larger than one hundred nodes. Importantly, the size of the 
logical attack graph is polynomial in size of a network, whereas the size of the attack 
graphs mentioned in section 2.1 is exponential [6]. The authors of [6] have used MulVAL 
system, which is a reasoning system to identify security vulnerabilities in enterprise 
networks automatically. Figure 3 shows Logical Attack Graph Generator designed by Ou 
et al. The MulVAL reasoning engine is based on XSB, which is a Prolog system 
developed by Stony Brook. Logical attack graphs have a direct relation between logical 
dependencies and configuration of individual nodes.  
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Figure 3. Logical Attack Graph Generator 
Source: [6] 
 
 The approach of logical attack graphs improves scalability significantly over 
original attack graphs because using MulVAL has performance advantage over using 
model checking systems.  
 
2.3 Data Mining Approach for Generating Attack Graphs 
Li et al. [5] have done research to suggest a data mining based approach to 
generate attack graphs. The purpose of their work is to use data mining to construct attack 
graphs. There is a casual relationship between an attacker and the alert raised by IDS. 
Therefore, the behaviors of alerts and attacks may be mined from the intrusion alerts 
database [5]. They perform data mining on intrusion alerts to find association rules from 
the dataset. The association rules extracted from the alerts database gives information 
about the alert sequences which are most frequent. An example of association rule is 
mentioned below: 
                   [A → B] →C 
         Support = 60, Confidence = 80 
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 This rule indicates that every time A → B are present in a sequence, the sequence 
is followed by C. The Support value suggests that 60 percent of all the sequences being 
examined have A, B and C alerts present. The Confidence value suggests that 80 percent 
of all the sequences that have A → B also contain C.  
 
Figure 4. Exploit-oriented attack graph, Source: [5] 
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An algorithm to find frequent alert sequences from the dataset, based on 
association rule mining, has been proposed in this work. The frequent alert sequences are 
combined together to form an attack graph.  
DARPA 1999 and DARPA 2000 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset have 
been used for this experiment [18]. This approach is different from the previous ones in a 
way that it does not require defining system states and security properties in advance. 
Therefore, there is no need for having prior knowledge of the system and maintaining the 
knowledge.  
 
2.4 Graph-Based Vulnerability Analysis 
In [4], the analysis about attack graphs mentions: For 5 hosts and 8 exploits, and 
the vulnerabilities associated with those exploits, NuSMV took 2 hours to execute and 
most of that time was spent on graph manipulation. The attack graph generated as a result 
had 5948 nodes and 68364 edges. The state space for that example was encoded with 229 
bits. 
In [3], the authors have suggested an approach in which the problem can be 
encoded with 229 nodes, one node for each bit in the state representation. They suggest a 
compact structure for an attack graph claiming that no information is lost in such compact 
encoding. The algorithm explodes the compact structure into an attack graph for an 
exhaustive analysis. To simplify the approach, they group together “attacker access 
privileges, network connectivity and vulnerabilities into generic attributes” [3]. An 
exploit is modeled as a transformation that, given a set of pre-conditions, produces a set 
of post-conditions. They define the concept of “monotonicity” which means that once a 
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pre-condition of an exploit is satisfied, it never becomes unsatisfied. Because of their 
concept of monotonicity, they can identify minimal attack chains without doing 
exhaustive analysis on an attack graph. The representation here does not have to 
encounter the exponential explosion problem and therefore, this approach is more 
realistic and practical for networks with hundreds of hosts according to the authors. 
 
2.5 Intrusion Alerts Analysis 
In [15] Siraj et al. have suggested an approach to improve offline analysis of 
intrusion alerts. Offline analysis of intrusion alerts is performed to investigate the system 
security breaches and determine the extent of intrusion. It differs from real time intrusion 
detection because offline analysis is not intended to detect and prevent intrusion as and 
when it happens. In [15], a hybrid clustering model based on Improved Unit Range (IUR) 
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is proposed. The structural correlation is 
performed by grouping the alerts with similar attribute values.  
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) raise multiple security alerts. 
Correlation of such alerts through clustering is important to improve detection and 
provide comprehensive analysis because the number of alerts raised is prohibitively large 
for a security expert to investigate each alert separately. Clustering of intrusion alerts can 
help filter false positives. The problem with intrusion correlation systems is that they 
require higher level of participation of security expert in developing and maintaining 
them as the patterns of attack often change [15].  The results of their clustering are 
compared with other similar clustering approaches, the clustering approach by the authors 
provides better results in terms of clustering quality and processing time. 
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3.0 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (IDS) 
In this section, Intrusion Detection Systems are discussed in detail. The 
understanding about the different types of IDS is important to understand the scope of 
this paper. According to [17], Intrusion Detection is defined as “the process of 
monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for 
signs of intrusions, defined as attempts to bypass the security mechanisms of a computer 
or network.” Intrusion Detection System can be a combination of software and hardware 
to perform intrusion detection [17]. 
Basically, there are two types of IDS, Host Based IDS and Network Based IDS.  
1. Host based IDS collects information such as system API calls, resource 
utilization, logs and the lists of running processes from the local system to 
detect any malicious activities.  
2. Network based IDS, also known as NIDS, monitors and analyzes the traffic of 
the network.  
Classification of IDS is also done based on the underlying methods and 
techniques used for detection:  
1. Anomaly based detection – the normal behavior of the system is predefined 
and any activity not conforming to normal behavior is considered as 
suspicious. 
2. Signature based detection – The patterns of malicious activities/attacks are 
developed. Traffic or activity that matches with the patterns is reported as 
intrusion. 
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From [17], the IDS can be different depending upon the time aspect. 
1. Real-time IDS – The alerts are raised immediately after an attack is detected. 
2. Off-line IDS – It serves as an analysis module for the IDS. The alerts are 
already collected and post-analysis is performed on alerts. It is useful to 
understand strategy and behavior of an attacker. 
The related work discussed in this paper is not directed towards improving 
Intrusion Detection System. The research is more inclined towards performing off-line 
analysis of intrusion alert information. The approach suggested in this paper, combines 
different topics such as attack graphs and clustering on sequences of alerts by graph 
clustering technique to perform off-line analysis on intrusion alerts. 
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4.0 DARPA DATASET AND SNORT IDS 
In this paper, DARPA 1999 datasets have been used to perform experiments. 
These datasets have been published by MIT Lincoln Laboratory for research and 
“evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems” [18]. These datasets are prepared by 
capturing TCP traffic of an experimental network when subjected to a systematic attack. 
The DARPA 1999 dataset contains data for 20 days.  
Snort [16] is a popular and powerful open source IDS which is freely available. 
Snort uses signature based detection techniques and it relies on “rules” to detect the 
intrusion. The rules of Snort IDS are maintained and regularly updated by Snort team. 
The traffic was replayed from the DARPA dataset. The Snort IDS raised alerts 
from the TCPDUMP files. The command to replay TCPDUMP traffic and record the 
alerts is as below: 
 
With appropriate configuration of Snort IDS, the alerts were directly recorded in 
MySQL database. The alerts have attributes associated with them which carry important 
security information such as source IP address, destination IP address, port numbers etc. 
Timestamp of each alert mentions the exact time when the attack was detected and the 
alert was raised.  The part of a database table containing intrusion alerts is shown in 
Figure 5(a).  
$ snort –c snort.conf –r tcpdumpfile 
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4.1 Alert Sequences 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Alert Sequences from alerts 
Source: [5] 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Attack Sequence 
Source: [5] 
 
 
The number of IDS alerts raised by Snort is large. The actual sequence of alerts in 
the database is considered as a global sequence of alerts [5].  In Figure 5 (a), the intrusion 
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alerts are listed as they appear in the alerts database. Signature ID represents the type of 
an alert. Start time indicates the time of the attack. The alerts are divided according to 
time window and alert sequences are formed.  Since multistage attacks occur in a certain 
time frame, the alerts are grouped into sequences according to the time interval chosen as 
“Time Window” Wt. When Wt is 1 hour, the “Candidate Attack Sequences” will appear 
as they are in Figure 5(b).  
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5.0 GRAPHCLUST 
Once the alerts are preprocessed and organized into attack sequences, the attack 
sequences can further be processed to prepare directed graphs. The directed graphs are 
Temporal Attack Graphs prepared from attack sequences. The graphs are clustered with 
the “GraphClust” [19]. Shasha et al. have done research to suggest a way to perform 
clustering on the graphs. “GraphClust” can be used for any application which can benefit 
from finding relationships among graphs. GraphClust works in three phases [19]: 
1. Finds highly connected substructures in each graph. 
2. Substructures serve as attributes of each graph. 
3. Normal clustering algorithms are applied to cluster graphs. 
GraphClust can work for any application which has data to be represented in form of 
graphs. GraphClust is scalable when working with many large sized graphs [19]. 
 
5.1 LNE Format 
To be able to use GraphClust on Attack Sequences, it is important to convert the 
attack sequences to graphs. GraphClust expects input graphs in “LNE” [19] format. LNE 
(“List of Nodes and Edges ids format”) format is a way to represent a graph in a text file. 
The specifications of LNE format are as mentioned below: 
1. The first line of each graph has a label of the graph and it should start with 
character ‘#’. The label must be a string containing numbers and alphabets. 
2. Second line indicates the number of nodes in the graph. 
3. Following lines contain labels of the nodes. 
4. Next line indicates number of edges in the graph. 
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5. Following lines are the node id pairs which mention edges in the graph.  
 
Figure 7. Sample Directed Graph named graph1 
 
The figure above represents a small graph. The LNE representation for the graph 
is given as:
 
 
    LNE representation of graph in Figure 7 
 
Therefore, the attack sequences are converted into directed graphs and directed 
graphs are written in a single file. The file is an input file for GraphClust. 
A 
C 
B 
 
#graph1 
3 
A 
B 
C 
3 
1 2 
1 3 
3 2 
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5.2 Graph Clustering 
Once attack sequences are featured as directed graphs, it can be provided to 
GraphClust for performing clustering on the temporal attack graphs. It is important to 
study the technique used for graph clustering. 
 
5.2.1 Attribute Selection 
Most clustering algorithms deal with a dataset which is comprised of a set of 
objects or items. The objects in the dataset are assigned to smaller subsets called clusters 
where all objects of a single cluster are similar to some degree. The similarity of objects 
is decided based upon their features or attributes. For example, every person has 
attributes such as height and weight. When a group of people is clustered, the people with 
similar values for height and weight will be assigned to the same cluster. Therefore, a 
graph must have a set of attributes to perform clustering on a set of graphs. GraphClust 
does not have prior knowledge about the attributes of the input graphs. The clustering 
process for the graphs suggested by GraphClust is explained in detail here. 
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Figure 8. Undirected graphs example 
 
Consider the graphs shown in Figure 8. First, the substructures are found for each 
graph in the input. 
Graph 1: substructures of graph up to length 3 are 
From upper node X: {X, XY, XZ, XYX} 
From node Y: {Y, YX, YZ, YX} 
From node Z: {Z, ZX, ZY, ZYX} 
X 
X 
Y 
Z 
Graph 1 
X 
Y Z 
Graph 2 
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From the other X node: {X, XY, XYZ, XYX} 
  Similarly for graph 2, 
 Graph 2: substructures of graph up to length 3 are  
 From node X: {X, XY, XZ} 
 From node Y: {Y, YX, YXZ} 
 From node Z: {Z, ZX, ZXY} 
  
Once all substructures are found, the matrix A is created. The columns of matrix 
A contains the union of substructures found from all the graphs. Matrix A has one row 
for each graph in the input. A[i, j] represents the number of times substructure j is present 
in graph i. In case of undirected graph, XYZ and ZYX represent the same substructure. 
The matrix A created from the given graphs, graph 1 and graph 2 in Figure 9, will appear 
as below. 
Matrix A: 
Graph Z ZX ZY ZYX X XY XYX Y YXZ 
Graph1 1 2 2 2 2 4 2 1 0 
Graph2 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 
 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix A for graph1 and graph2 
 Finding substructures from large sized graphs can be very expensive. Therefore, 
GraphClust only supports substructure length up to 4. The length limit of 4 is 
significantly restrictive. Hence, GraphClust provides a way to eliminate this limitation. 
GraphClust provides an option to use “Subdue” [20] to find “common substructures” 
from the input graphs. Subdue, developed by University of Texas at Arlington, is a 
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“graph-based knowledge discovery system” that can perform mining on data represented 
in graphs and find structural patterns [20]. GraphClust can delegate work of finding 
common substructures in graphs to Subdue. Shasha et Al., the creators of GraphClust, 
recommend using Subdue to find common patterns in graphs.  
 Once the common substructures are found and matrix A has been created, the 
clustering algorithms supported by GraphClust can begin the task of clustering the 
graphs.  
Finding distance between two items is very important in clustering. The distance 
between two items actually determines similarity among the items in an input set. Two 
items can be close to each other according to one function can be far from each other 
based on another distance function. A commonly used distance function is Euclidean 
distance. The Euclidean distance between two n-dimensional vectors (X1, X2, …, Xn) and 
(Y1, Y2, …,Yn), where n > 1, is calculated as square root of  
(X1 – Y1)2 + (X2 – Y2)2 + ……+ (Xn – Yn)2. 
 
In GraphClust approach, for each graph, the frequency of each common 
substructure is recorded as an integer number. Therefore, it is possible to find Euclidean 
distance between graph 1 and graph 2 based on values in matrix A. Also, GraphClust 
provides choice of inner product of two vectors as a distance metric. The inner product of 
two vectors V1 = (X1, X2, …,Xn)  and V2 = (Y1, Y2, …,Yn) is calculated as  
Inner product (V1, V2) = X1Y1 + X2Y2 + ……+ XnYn 
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For the purpose of clustering graphs, Euclidean distance is better choice for a 
distance metric since it is calculating less distance between similar graphs. 
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6.0 GRAPH-BASED INTRUSION ALERT CORRELATION 
In this paper, a technique to perform analysis on intrusion alert sequences, which 
is different from clustering individual alerts, is proposed. Intrusion alert correlation is a 
powerful way of analyzing intrusion alerts as discussed in section 2.0.  Though clustering 
on alerts provides insight about the security of the system, additional analysis on alerts in 
necessary. Many times, vulnerability is exploited only after all its preconditions are 
satisfied. For example, an attacker has to gain a root level access to modify administrator 
level settings of the system. Therefore, this paper proposes an approach about alert 
correlation which combines the concepts of attack graphs and graph-based clustering for 
performing clustering on alert sequences. 
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6.1 System Architecture 
 The diagram of system architecture is shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. System Architecture Diagram 
 
 
As shown in the diagram, the processing and analyzing the alerts is done in steps:  
Internet 
Alerts 
database 
SNORT 
IDS 
 
Clusters of 
Alert 
Sequences 
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Alert 
Sequences 
Temporal 
Attack 
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1. Collect alerts from the network. 
2. Perform preprocessing on the alerts to get attack sequences. 
3. Prepare temporal attack graphs from the attack sequences. 
4. Perform clustering on temporal attack graphs using GraphClust. 
 
The approach suggested here can perform clustering on alert sequences. Alert 
sequences contain the alerts which are recorded by IDS in specified time interval. The 
alert sequences are represented as directed graphs, and the graphs are clustered using 
GraphClust, a tool for performing graph-based clustering. 
 
6.2 Alert Collection from Network 
For the experiments in this paper, Snort IDS has been used. Snort is a popular and 
widely used Network Intrusion Detection System. Snort can monitor traffic and raise 
alarms/alerts in real time.  To collect the intrusion alerts, the simulation of attack on the 
network is necessary. Then, the alerts raised by the intrusion detection can be used for 
further processing and analysis of attacks. 
DARPA 1999 dataset, published by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, are used to collect 
alert information. These dataset contains TCPDUMP files recorded for 3 weeks from a 
simulated network. TCPDUMP is a popular tool which can capture and display packets 
from the traffic in the network.  
To collect intrusion alert information, the TCPDUMP files from the first week of 
data were replayed. The Snort IDS was used to monitor the recorded traffic and the Snort 
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IDS raised alerts which were stored into the MySQL database. The command to raise 
alerts using snort from the TCPDUMP file is as follows: 
 
The alerts raised are stored in the database along with other attributes of the alerts. 
The most important information about an alert is the timestamp associated with it. The 
timestamp value gives the exact information about the time when the attack was detected 
and the alert was raised by Snort. Therefore, after performing this step, the alert 
information is extracted from the DARPA dataset and the alerts, along with their 
timestamp and signature ID, are recorded in the database. The timestamp of each alert is 
useful to sort the alert in the exact order the attacks were detected and alert were raised 
by IDS. 
 
6.3 Preprocessing the Alerts and Preparing Attack Sequences 
 Once the alerts are recorded in the database, the next step is to process the alert 
information and prepare it for the next step of the processing. The alerts have signature id 
and timestamp information with it. Each signature id is an integer number and indicates a 
different type of an attack. The whole set of intrusion alerts is sorted in ascending order 
by their timestamp is called global attack sequence. 
 The “Attack Sequence Time Window” [5] is the time interval which is moved 
along the global attack sequence. Attack Sequence Time Window is shown previously in 
Figure 5. In this step, the global sequence of attacks is broken down into smaller attack 
$ snort –c snort.conf –r tcpdumpfile 
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sequences. The time interval selected for the Attack Sequence Time Window is 4 minutes 
based on the experiments in [5]. If the chosen time interval for Attack Sequence Time 
Window is long, the generated alert sequences will appear as a long series of alerts. The 
temporal attack graphs generated from such long sequences can be large in size. 
GraphClust can take a long time to perform clustering on temporal attack graphs when 
the graphs are huge in size.  
Many times, the attacks are carried out in a multistep fashion. An attacker has to 
have certain privileges to perform certain attacks. When the attack sequences are created, 
an alert appears between other alerts which were raised shortly before and after it. 
Therefore, Attack Sequence Time Window can divide global sequence of attacks into 
sequences which may have alerts with their prerequisite alerts as well. 
 For the experiments, the Attack Sequence Time Window was chosen as 4 minutes 
according to [5]. From the whole set of sequences, 1000 sequences were chosen for the 
experiment. 
 
6.4 Temporal Attack Graphs 
 From the previous step, the attack sequences are extracted from the global 
sequences of alerts. The relationship existing between alerts in attack sequences can be 
used to form directed graphs. In this paper, such directed graphs are referred to as 
Temporal Attack Graphs. Attack graphs represent the security of the system in a way that 
a node represents a state of the system and an edge represents an action of an attacker. 
There are variations of attack graphs, called exploit-oriented attack graphs, where every 
  29 
node in a graph represents an action of an attacker. Temporal attack graphs share similar 
property and every node is an alert raised by the IDS within the time window. 
The technique of creating temporal attack graphs from attack sequences is simple 
but useful. The sequences of alerts will be processed and the corresponding temporal 
attack graph will have a node for each kind of an alert. There will be a directed edge 
between the alerts occurring consecutively.  
The temporal attack graphs have to be represented in a form that can easily be 
processed by the next step. GraphClust is used to perform the clustering on the temporal 
attack graphs. GraphClust accepts a single text file as an input file and all the input 
graphs must be represented in LNE format inside that file. LNE format is a mandatory 
format for GraphClust. LNE format is a specification for representation of the undirected 
and directed graphs in plain text. The first line of a graph must contain a label of the 
graph and it has to be preceded by ‘#’ character. The next line indicates the number of 
nodes in the graph. The next lines indicate a label for every node, one label in a single 
line. The following line must indicate the number of edges in the graph. The set of lines 
in the end represent the edges in the graph. The edges are marked as a pair of node labels. 
 
6.5 Clustering Temporal Attack Graphs 
The temporal attack graphs found in previous step are formatted in LNE format 
and the input file is created which contains all the graphs to be clustered. The GraphClust 
tool is run to perform clustering on the graphs. GraphClust tries to find common 
substructures from all the graphs provided as inputs. The discovery of common 
substructures is done better when it is done by Subdue.  
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The common substructures extracted from the graphs are treated as attributes of a 
graph. The number of times a substructures is present becomes a value of the 
corresponding attribute of a graph. So, every graph has a non-negative integer value for 
each attribute. Therefore, for every graph, a non-negative integer valued vector is 
available. Since attributes of every graph can be represented as vectors, it is possible to 
compare two graphs for similarity. Distance metric can be used to find similarity between 
two graphs. If the distance between two graphs is smaller, then the graphs are close to 
each other. If the distance between two graphs is a bigger value, then the graphs are far 
from each other. Distance metric is very important for clustering algorithm. A clustering 
algorithm should build the clusters in a way that all the graphs in a single cluster are close 
to one another. 
GraphClust provides two types of distance functions, one of them is Euclidean 
distance and the other is inner product of two vectors. For the purpose of clustering 
temporal attack graphs, Euclidean distance has been used as a distance metric. Because, 
when the Euclidean distance between two graphs is smaller, it means that they have a lot 
more substructures in common and they have similar topology of the graph.  For the 
purpose of clustering on graphs based on their similarity, Euclidean distance turns out to 
be a better choice than inner product. 
The output of GraphClust is an output file which clearly indicates the number of 
clusters formed based upon the input graphs provided. Each cluster has one of the graphs 
as its centroid. A centroid of a cluster is basically a center of a particular cluster. Other 
graphs which are part of a single cluster are listed together. Also, a distance of a graph 
from the center of a cluster is indicated. GraphClust supports two basic algorithms for 
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performing clustering, K-means neighbor algorithm and Antipole algorithm. While using 
K-means neighbor, number of clusters has to be explicitly mentioned. Antipole algorithm 
is faster than K-means [19].  In case of Antipole clustering algorithm, value between 1 
and 4 has to be provided as a tightness measure. The radius of the cluster becomes 
smaller if higher value of tightness is selected and the number of clusters is bigger. 
Antipole algorithm decides the number of clusters dynamically and not from the user 
input. 
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7.0 EXPERIMENTS 
The system architecture and steps for performing graph-based clustering on 
intrusion alerts is explained earlier. In this section, the details about the experiments on 
the intrusion alert data is published. 
The intrusion alerts were collected from the first week of DARPA 1999 dataset. 
After replaying TCPDUMP on Snort IDS, the alerts were collected. The intrusion alerts 
were preprocessed to form smaller alert sequences based on 4 minute window. Out of all 
the sequences, 1000 alert sequences were selected. These 1000 alert sequences were 
converted to directed graphs and these directed graphs were denoted in LNE format and 
written to a single file. 
 The command used to run GraphClust is as follows: 
 
 Where, LNEgraph_1000.txt is input file which contains 1000 graphs in LNE 
format, “-s S” option commands GraphClust to use Subdue to find common substructures 
from 1000 graphs, “-m E” asks GraphClust to use Euclidean distance function as a 
distance metric for clustering and “–g D” option is used to indicate the graphs in input 
file are directed graphs.  
./graphclust_main -tightness 3 -s S -m E –g D LNEgraph_1000.txt 
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Figure 10. Correlation substructures pairs by GraphClust 
 
 
 Figure 10 above shows a screenshot taken from GraphClust. The pairs of graphs 
are shown on the left side and their common substructure is shown. GraphClust shows 
the substructures pairs in correlated graphs. The chart in figure 11 shows the clustering 
on 1000 temporal attack graphs. The x-axis represents the clusters formed as the result. 
The height of each cluster represents the number of temporal attack graphs assigned to a 
particular cluster. 
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   Figure 11. Clustering on 1000 graphs 
 
GraphClust classified 1000 graphs into 29 clusters. To test the results, clustering 
was performed using different distance metric, which is Inner Product function. When 
inner product function was used as distance metric, there were total 158 clusters and most 
of the clusters were of really small size, containing only one item in the cluster. Whereas, 
in case when Euclidean distance was used as a distance, there were 29 clusters with no 
cluster having only single element, which is the cluster of size 1. So, Euclidean distance 
function is a better choice for graph clustering based upon similarity in substructures. 
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7.1 Test Cases 
 As discussed earlier, the alert sequences are represented in the form of temporal 
attack graphs and are clustered with graph-based clustering. For measuring quality of 
clustering, test cases were designed and results of clustering were observed. When all 
input graphs are very similar to one another, in other words, if all input graphs are close 
to one another based on their similarity, all input graphs should be classified in a single 
cluster in an ideal case. Accordingly, when the input graphs do not have common 
substructures, in other words, they are far from one another based on their similarity as 
distance among them, every input graph should be assigned to a different cluster in an 
ideal case. To test these two cases, two separate input sets were prepared and clustering 
was performed separately on each input set. 
 
7.1.1 Clustering temporal attack graphs with a high degree of similarity 
 From the results of the experiment discussed in section 6.0, a cluster of 
considerably big size was chosen and all temporal attack graphs belonging to the cluster 
were added to an input file. Since all the temporal attack graphs which were chosen 
belonged to a same cluster, it was obvious that the temporal attack graphs were similar to 
one another. The selected graphs were close to one another based on Euclidean distance 
when common substructures of the graphs are designated as their features. It means that 
each alert sequence represented by a temporal attack graph contained common attacks or 
common attack paths. According to the test done for this case on the system, Sixty-five 
input graphs were provided as input to GraphClust. Fifty-nine of them were assigned to 
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one single cluster. Six out of sixty-five were not clustered in the same cluster. The same 
results are shown in a chart in Figure 12.   
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  Figure 12. Clustering on 65 similar temporal attack graphs 
 
Fifty-nine graphs were assigned to Cluster 1 and remaining six graphs were 
assigned to Cluster 2. Ideally, all sixty-five graphs should have been assigned to Cluster 
1. But, in the previous experiment discussed in section 6.0, there were total 1000 
temporal attack graphs to be clustered. In the test case discussed in this section, there 
were only 65 temporal attack graphs chosen as an input set. It shows that the distance 
between two items is considered relative and not absolute while clustering. Two points 
can be seen as close to each other in reference to 1000 other points, but the same points 
can be seen as far from each other if there are no points as reference. 
 
  37 
7.1.2 Clustering temporal attack graphs with a high degree of dissimilarity 
To perform this test, there were 65 temporal attack graphs chosen, and the graphs 
were different from one another to a great degree. The temporal attack graphs were 
generated from the alerts raised by SNORT on DARPA dataset as mentioned earlier. The 
graphs were chosen in such a way that they did not have common substructures. The 
absence of common substructures meant that the graphs did not have common attack or 
attack paths. The size of the input for this test was chosen as 65 graphs just to match it 
with the size of the input chosen for the previous test. The results of the test are shown in 
Figure 13.  
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     Figure 13. Clustering on 65 dissimilar temporal attack graphs 
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The x-axis of the graph shows the different clusters that were created from the 
input set of temporal attack graphs. The y-axis of the graph represents the size of clusters. 
There were 40 clusters of size 1, 1 cluster of size 7 and 1 cluster of size 8.  The 40 
clusters of size 1 indicate that each temporal attack graph out of 40 was assigned to a 
different cluster. This result supported the idea that the graphs should be assigned to 
separate clusters when they have a high degree of dissimilarity among them.  
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8.0 RESULTS  
In “Intelligent Clustering with PCA and Unsupervised Learning Algorithm in 
Intrusion Alert Correlation”, Siraj et al. have proposed a clustering technique for 
clustering and correlation of alerts [15]. According to [15], the correlation of intrusion 
alerts through clustering can help reduce number of alerts and extract attack steps of an 
attacker. The system architecture diagram is shown below: 
 
 
Figure 14.  System Architecture Diagram by Siraj et al. 
 Source: [15] 
 
The research and the approach to correlation of intrusion alerts in [21, 14] is 
similar to [15]. 
Before the results are presented, it is important to consider the scope of the work 
done in this paper. The suggested approach to process and analyze intrusion alerts is 
meant for post-analysis of intrusion alerts. Similar to the approach suggested by Siraj et 
al., the work presented in this paper is targeted to processing and analyzing intrusion 
alerts, and cluster alert sequences by forming temporal attack graphs and performing 
graph-based clustering. In following subsections, the comparison with the alert 
correlation technique by other researchers is presented. 
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8.1 Clustering on Alerts vs. Clustering on Alert Sequences 
a). The alert correlation used by other researchers is only analyzing individual 
alerts instead of looking at an alert in the context of preceding and following alerts. The 
ordinary alert clustering works as follows. The alert correlation only finds the alerts with 
similar values for corresponding attributes and based on their similarities assigns them in 
clusters. Consider the below example as a database of alerts. Alert No. is just a way of 
representing a sequence number for each alert. Each row represents an alert raised by an 
IDS and each column is an attribute of an alert. The letters A, B, C, D, P, Q, R and S are 
only placeholders for real values of corresponding attributes. 
 
Alert No. Alert 
Type 
Source IP Destination 
IP 
Source Port Destination 
port 
1 - A B C D 
2 - P Q  R S 
3 - A B C D 
4 - A B C D 
5 - P Q  R S 
6 - A B C D 
7 - P Q  R S 
 
Table 2. Example – sample alerts attribute values 
 
From the above table, there will be two clusters. Since 1, 3, 4 and 6 (grey 
background) have similar values for all corresponding attributes, they will be assigned to 
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one cluster. Similarly, 2, 5 and 7 will be assigned to another cluster. The alert correlation 
with such clustering is useful in reducing number of alerts and filtering the alerts.  
 
b). The approach suggested in this paper applies a different technique to cluster 
intrusion alert information.  A table of data is given below for example. The alerts are not 
clustered directly depending on their similarity. First, the sequences are formed from the 
alerts database. The sequences have timestamp values associated with it and it indicates 
the timing of the sequence of alerts. The sequence of alerts is represented in form of 
directed graphs which are called temporal attack graphs. The clustering is performed on 
temporal attack graphs created from alert sequences. The basic difference is that the 
previous approach considers an alert as an independent entity. It is also important to 
consider the alerts which are reported shortly before and after the alert. In other words, 
the proposed approach can cluster incidents rather than just alerts. 
 
 
Sequence ID Timestamp Attack Sequence 
101 08:23:11 9/9/2009  1 2 25 31 4 4 4  
201 09:15:01 9/9/2009 1 1 1 2 25 31 0 
301 11:20:23 9/9/2009 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7  
401 11:45:43 9/9/2009 2 1 2 25 31 4 
 
Table 3. Example – sample alerts sequences 
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From the given table, the attack sequences with ids 101, 201 and 401 will be 
assigned to a single cluster since they have common substructure “1 2 25 31”. “1 2 25 
31” sequence is given just for an example. Each number in sequence means a type of an 
alert. Therefore, if security expert finds out at the later stage the sequence “1 2 25 31” is 
malicious; all the sequences in the same cluster must be examined since they are most 
likely to match the pattern under scrutiny. Also, from the timestamps of each sequence, 
the timings of all such malicious attacks/probes can be analyzed. This way, a security 
expert can find out all the instances of the incident which might have happened at 
different times. Almost all the members of a cluster share common substructures. So, this 
work, the suggested approach of clustering the alert sequences, can act as additional 
analysis of intrusion alerts. 
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8.2 Results of Clustering Alert Sequences 
 
Metric Clustering on temporal attack graphs/ alert 
sequences 
 
# of items to be clustered 400 600 800 1000 
# of attributes Number of attributes is determined dynamically. 
Running time 15 min. 27 min. 49 min. 60 min. 
# of clusters 33 26 34 29 
 
Table 4. Results of Clustering Alert Sequences 
 
In the above table, the results of graph-based clustering technique, suggested in 
this paper, are shown.  
 
1. Number of Items to be clustered – This number simply mentions the number of 
items (temporal attack graphs) which were given as input to the graph clustering 
program. For graph-based clustering approach, the system has been tested by 
performing clustering on 400, 600, 800 and 1000  alert sequences to observe the 
performance trend with the increase in the size of input. First, 400 input alert 
sequences were selected for clustering. Then, 200 additional alert sequences 
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were added to prepare the next larger input set each time. Hence, the first 400 
alert sequences were present in all input sets. 
 
2. Number of Attributes – Since the ordinary alert clustering method clusters 
individual alerts, alert attributes are already known in that case. The alerts 
database used in individual alert clustering technique is in IDMEF format. 
IDMEF stands for Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format. IDMEF is 
XML specification for storing intrusion alert information. Siraj et al. have used 
fixed number of attributes for clustering. While working with graphs, there is no 
previous knowledge about the attributes of the temporal attack graphs. Hence, 
the number of common substructures is determined after the input data is 
provided to GraphClust. Also, the number of attributes can change when 
another graph dataset is chosen for clustering. The common substructures from 
the graphs are discovered by “Subdue”. Therefore, the number of attributes 
depends upon input data and may vary for different inputs of the same size. 
Subdue discovered 400 substructures/attributes from the input file containing 
400 graphs. In case of 1000 input graphs, it discovered 1000 common 
substructures. 
 
3. Running Time – Clustering on individual alerts takes less time because every 
alert has a limited number of attributes and its size is always going to be 
bounded by the number of alerts and the number of attributes. In case of graphs, 
size of graph can not be bounded. A graph can have only a single node and it 
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can also have millions of nodes. Therefore, the time for clustering 1000 or 400 
graphs can not easily be estimated or bounded. The time for calculation of 
substructures is added to the total time required for clustering. There is a huge 
difference between the numbers of attributes considered for clustering. Graph-
based clustering has to deal with a lot bigger number of attributes. The graph-
based clustering was performed separately on 400, 600, 800 and 1000 graphs. It 
took 15, 27, 49 and 60 minutes to cluster 400, 600, 800 and 1000 graphs 
respectively. From the table, it can be seen that the running time increases with 
the increase in the size of input.  
 
4. Number of Clusters – In graph-based clustering, there were 33, 26, 34 and 29 
clusters created from 400, 600, 800 and 1000 input graphs respectively. Since 
the first 400 graphs for input sets were kept as a part of all input sets, there is no 
drastic change in the number of clusters rendered. The number of clusters 
cannot simply increase or decrease with the size of the input, but it depends on 
the similarity present among the set of graphs given as input. 
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9.0 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the concept of graph clustering is studied and applied to intrusion 
alert data generated by Intrusion Detection System. The clusters of alert sequences which 
are computed by this approach can provide a ground for better analysis of the intrusion 
alerts than just correlation of individual alerts through clustering. As mentioned earlier, 
the proposed approach can cluster alert sequences, hence incidents, rather than just 
individual intrusion alerts. Since clustering is an unsupervised classification technique, 
training with the labeled data is not required. Few actions of an attacker can raise 
multiple alerts. Since the alert is examined along with the context, the strategy of an 
attacker can be mapped to a group of alerts. The clusters can help identify similar 
incidents from huge dataset. 
The experiments and tests performed on the proposed system, discussed in 
previous sections, have shown that the alert sequences can be clustered based on their 
similarity in terms of steps taken for an attack. Clustering on the input set with all input 
graphs similar to one another assigned almost all the input graphs to a single cluster. In 
the same way, clustering on the input set with all input graphs dissimilar to one another 
assigned almost every input graph to a separate cluster. Hence, the proposed approach 
can perform clustering on alert sequences or temporal attack graphs considering common 
substructures as attributes. It is concluded that the graph-based clustering can be an 
important technique for analysis of intrusion alert sequences. The clusters generated can 
also be used for filtering false alarms and redundant alerts.  
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10.0 FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, a technique to analyze the intrusion alerts by performing graph-
based clustering is proposed and it differs from the work of other researchers who have 
proposed correlation of intrusion alerts by clustering. Though the clustering on the alert 
sequences can be more helpful than clustering on individual alerts, the system takes 
longer time to perform clustering. Improving the performance for large size datasets is 
next important step in the direction of taking this system to a practical solution for 
analysis on intrusion alerts. Once the system is scalable, the next step will be to test this 
system on real world data and conduct benchmarking. 
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